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1. Introduction 
That our event talk is vague is no news. Unlike facts, events are particulars lo-
cated in space and time. But in ordinary circumstances it is utterly difficult, if 
not impossible, to specify the exact extent of the relevant spatiotemporal loca-
tion. We say that Brutus stabbed Caesar and we intend to refer to an event —
Brutus’s stabbing of Caesar—that took place at a certain time in a certain place. 
It took place in the Senate (not in the Coliseum) during the Ides of March (not 
April) in Rome, 44 BC. But where exactly in the Senate did this event take 
place? Did it spread only through Brutus and Caesar? Did it spread through their 
entire bodies? (Was Brutus’s left ear involved at all in this event?) Did it also 
spread through some space between them? Through what portion of space? And 
when exactly on March 15 did the killing begin? When exactly did it end? 
We don’t think the difficulty here is purely epistemic, as if it were just a 
matter of ignoring the facts.1 It’s not that there is this event, Brutus’s killing of 
Caesar, that has perfectly precise and yet unknown spatiotemporal boundaries, 
boundaries that historians have not been able (and will never be able) to locate. 
It’s not that such events as the industrial revolution, the discovery of penicillin, 
or World War II have precise and unknown spatiotemporal boundaries whose 
location eschews us. The indeterminacy here is not epistemic, or so we claim. 
Does it follow that the indeterminacy is ontological—that events such as these 
have fuzzy spatial or temporal boundaries? We don’t think so, either. Our diffi-
culty in answering the above questions does not concern the ontological make-
up of the relevant events. It concerns the structure of our event talk. It is the 
event designators we use that are vague, not the events themselves.2 It is con-
ceivable that to each region of space-time there correspond one or more events 
of some sort. But our way of talking about such goings-on is very loose and, as a 
consequence, indeterminate.  
Are events any different from objects in this regard? You point to an irregu-
larly shaped protruding piece of land and say: ‘Mount Everest’. Exactly what 
object are you referring to? What are its spatial boundaries? And what are its 
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temporal boundaries—at least, what is the time of its coming into being? What 
are the spatiotemporal boundaries of the Mississippi River? Of downtown Man-
hattan? Of the cloud over the bell tower? Surely our object talk is also affected 
heavily by the phenomenon of vagueness. And surely one could give an account 
of such vagueness without blaming our ignorance and without implying that its 
source is ontological. There are plenty of physical objects out there—plenty of 
slightly distinct and yet precisely determinate chunks of matter. And when we 
say ‘Mount Everest’, or when we baptize a region ‘Mount Everest’, we are just 
being vague as to which of these objects we are referring to. Indeed, it is con-
ceivable that to each region of space there corresponds, at any time, one or more 
objects of some sort, though our way of talking about such objects is very loose 
and, consequently, indeterminate.  
There is, in fact, a striking similarity between the vagueness of our ordinary 
object talk and the vagueness of our event talk. And this similarity is reassuring 
if we think that events should be included in an inventory of the world. For, to 
the extent that we know how to handle the former—to the extent that the vague-
ness of our object-referring expressions does not seem to be a good reason to do 
away with the ontological category of objects3—to that extent we can feel com-
fortable with the thought that the massive vagueness affecting our event-
referring expressions could be adequately handled without casting any doubts on 
the legitimacy of the ontological category of events. A supervaluational account, 
for example, could do the job in both cases:4 what we say, when we speak 
vaguely, is true if and only if it is true under every admissible semantic refine-
ment (or “precisification”) of our words.  
Unfortunately, this is not the end of the story. In the case of events, it would 
appear that the vagueness bites deeper, and this is where one begins to worry. In 
the case of events the vagueness appears to bite deeper because it does not seem 
to stem exclusively from the vagueness of the words occurring in the expres-
sions that we use to talk about them. This is especially clear if we consider that 
most—if not all—event-referring expressions are not proper names (whose ref-
erents could be arbitrarily refined) but definite descriptions obtained by nominal-
ization of some event-reporting sentence. Characteristic of a description is that 
its referent depends on the meaning of its constituents, and it would be natural to 
expect that if the meaning of such constituents (names and predicates) were 
sharply defined, then so would be the referent of the whole description—hence 
its location. With objects this is the case, at least insofar as refining a predicate 
amounts to specifying a decision procedure for determining its extension. Thus, 
if the sortal ‘cloud’ were suitably refined, the description ‘the cloud over the bell 
tower’ would pick out a perfectly definite chunk of reality. If the name ‘Manhat-
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tan’ and the modifier ‘downtown’ were sharply defined, the term ‘Downtown 
Manhattan’ would pick out a definite region of space. And so on. Although in 
practice such refinements are out of reach, their availability as a matter of prin-
ciple plays a significant role in our way of confining the vagueness of such 
expressions to the realm of semantics. By contrast, even if the semantics of 
every word we use were sharply defined, it would seem that an event-referring 
expression could still be vague in that it might still be indeterminate what region 
of space-time corresponds to the event in question. We may suppose that the 
exact reference of the two names, ‘Brutus’ and ‘Caesar’, is perfectly defined. 
And we may suppose that the extension of the relational predicate ‘stabbed’ is 
also perfectly precise, consisting of a certain set of well-defined ordered pairs 
among which, as it turns out, is the pair 〈Brutus, Caesar〉. We may thus, at least 
in principle, suppose that every term occurring in the sentence  
(1) Brutus stabbed Caesar 
is non-vague. Yet the event-referring description that comes from this sentence 
by ordinary nominalization would still be indeterminate: the spatiotemporal 
boundaries of Brutus’s stabbing of Caesar would still be unsettled. And this ap-
pears to introduce a worrying asymmetry between ordinary event talk and object 
talk. 
This line of reasoning is pressing. Nonetheless we think it can be resisted, 
and in the following we shall outline a way of resisting it. As long as we are 
clear about the context-sensitivity of our linguistic practices, we shall argue, the 
asymmetry turns out to be immaterial and a broadly semantic account of the 
relevant indeterminacy can be given in the case of events as well. 
2. Events and Participants 
There is, in fact, a simple way of restoring the symmetry that suggests itself im-
mediately. Events have participants and these participants are spatiotemporally 
located. Hence, assuming this to hold generally, the question of an event’s loca-
tion could be settled indirectly by reference to the location of its participants.5 
More precisely, one could rely on the following principle: 
(A) The location of an event is the mereological sum of the locations of its par-
ticipants. 
This is especially plausible if we go along with the standard metaphysical pic-
ture, according to which an event is the exemplification of a property or relation 
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by certain objects at a certain time.6 On this view, what an event is depends on 
what those objects—the participants—are. So it is reasonable to suppose that the 
location of an event, too, depends on that of its participants. Although this is not 
enough to justify (A), there is nothing implausible in this way of cashing out the 
relevant dependence vis-à-vis locative properties. If Brutus stabbed Caesar and 
nobody else took part in this event (as we may assume for the sake of simplic-
ity), it is not implausible to suppose that the spatial location of the event referred 
to by the phrase ‘Brutus’s stabbing of Caesar’ at any time t during which this 
event took place is neither more nor less than the mereological sum of the spatial 
location of Brutus at t and the spatial location of Caesar at t.7 This still leaves 
room for indeterminacy with respect to the temporal location of the event, as the 
relevant period of time may still be vaguely defined. But that can be put aside. 
We may suppose that the predicate ‘stabbed’ is more informative in this regard 
than we have conjectured, so the answer might come from there. For any way of 
specifying a time of occurrence of an event, (A) would deliver a corresponding 
answer concerning its spatial location. 
There is, unfortunately, an obvious difficulty that a solution along these 
lines must address.8 The difficulty arises insofar as the notion of an event par-
ticipant may itself be up for grabs. Of course a full-blown metaphysical theory 
of events would say something about this—it would provide some means for an-
swering the question of what it is for an object to qualify as an event participant. 
But even assuming that metaphysical question to be adequately answered, there 
remains the semantic question of how (or even whether) the participants of an 
event can be inferred from a linguistic report of the event itself. Suppose (1) is 
true: Brutus stabbed Caesar. Then it is plausible to suppose that Brutus was one 
of the entities involved in the stabbing—the agent, or subject—and Caesar was 
another one—the patient, or object. But if we are liberal enough with regard to 
mereological composition, then any mereological sum including Brutus would 
also qualify as a participant: it was involved in the stabbing after all, albeit only 
partially. Ditto for any mereological sum including Caesar. Indeed, if the uni-
verse as a whole were to count as an object, then it would take part in every 
event and (A) would imply that every event has the same (maximal) location. 
This would make (A) utterly useless.  
An obvious suggestion would be to refine (A) in such a way as to rule out 
those participants that are not fully involved in the event.9 That is, we could 
distinguish between minimal participants, all parts of which are themselves 
involved in the event, and larger objects that only participate in the event by 
virtue of including a participant among their parts. Then we could refine (A) 
along the following lines: 
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(A') The location of an event is the mereological sum of the locations of its 
minimal participants. 
This proposal, however, would still be inadequate. Just as (A) suffered from the 
vagueness of ‘participant’, (A') obviously suffers from the vagueness of the 
minimality constraint. What exactly does it mean to be fully involved in an 
event? As already mentioned, perhaps not all of Brutus was relevantly engaged 
in the stabbing of Caesar (his left ear played no role, say). So it is not clear just 
how much of Brutus should be considered to individuate the location of the 
event. Even if we ruled out such worries by stipulation, assuming for instance 
that every stabbing must indeed be performed by a whole person, we could 
hardly count on stipulations being available in every case. Consider 
(2) Titanic hit the iceberg and down it went. 
There are two events involved here, a collision and a sinking. The sinking was of 
Titanic as a whole, that much is clear. It had exactly one participant, and it was 
Titanic.10 What about the collision—what were its participants? Well, every col-
lision has at least two participants. And if we are talking about a collision be-
tween Titanic and the iceberg, then the natural thing to say is that the two par-
ticipants are Titanic and the iceberg. Can we also say that they are the minimal 
participants of the event in question? Surely part of Titanic hit part of the ice-
berg. But there are huge parts of Titanic and huge parts of the iceberg that were 
not directly involved in the collision. They were affected by the collision, we 
may say, but they did not quite collide. And the fact that we synecdochically 
mention the whole of Titanic and the whole of the iceberg in order to pick out the 
collision should not confuse us any more than the fact that we may mention the 
collision in order to pick out those objects in their entirety. (‘Titanic is that thing 
that collided against the iceberg’.) So neither Titanic nor the iceberg are good 
candidates for the minimal participants of the event in question. Are there any 
good candidates? Exactly what parts of Titanic hit what parts of the iceberg? Up 
to a point this is a matter of knowing the facts. But were the facts known— were 
we given a full report of that dramatic collision—we would still have difficulties 
answering the question. No non-arbitrary stipulations could do the job for us. 
On the face of it, then, neither (A) nor (A') are adequate criteria for deter-
mining the location of every event. However, it may still be argued that either 
criterion represents a step forward vis-à-vis the cloud of suspicion that surrounds 
the event concept. For if something like (A) or (A') is assumed, then the vague-
ness involved in some of our event-referring expressions could be explained in 
terms of the indeterminacy affecting the notion of a (minimal) participant. This 
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notion admits of several distinct precisifications, it could be argued, each of 
which is compatible with our linguistic practices. So a standard supervaluational 
account could be given after all. If every precisification yields the same location, 
then fine; otherwise the location is to be rated indeterminate because the com-
petition among the admissible choices prevents us from settling the issue. (Never 
mind if you don’t like supervaluational treatments of vagueness. Once the vague-
ness of ‘participant’ or ‘minimal participant’ is acknowledged, all sorts of se-
mantic accounts can be implemented. We take supervaluationism to be the best 
option so we shall stick to it, but nothing significant will depend on this choice.) 
3. Modes of Precisification 
Let us, then, take a closer look at this suggestion. In order for it to be effective, 
we must be specific about the indeterminacy underlying the notion of a (mini-
mal) participant. One way to cash out the nature of this indeterminacy is to say 
that the concept of a (minimal) participant is vague, so that (A) and (A') are at 
best vague criteria. This would place the burden of the indeterminacy on the the-
ory of location that (A) and (A') aim to express. That is, the semantics of the ob-
ject language could be treated along familiar lines, whether we are dealing with 
event- or object-referring expressions; yet a difference would show up insofar as 
the former, unlike the latter, turn out to be resistant to the advantages associated 
with the supposition that all vagueness can in principle be eliminated by suitably 
precisifying the vocabulary of the object language. If (A) and (A') are vague cri-
teria, then our event talk can only be precisified in a vague manner.  
This way of putting things is perfectly coherent, but we find it unsatisfac-
tory as a matter of general methodology. A vague theory is not a good theory, 
and we should not buy into it unless we are forced to do so. We have said before 
that a full-blown metaphysical theory should provide some means for answering 
the question of what it is for an object to qualify as an event participant, hence 
we should better suppose that such means are precise or else we would be forced 
to admit some form of ontological vagueness. So here is a second, alternative way 
to cash out the nature of the indeterminacy underlying the notion of a (minimal) 
participant. The semantics of (A) and (A'), we can say, is fine as it stands; it is 
the semantics of the object language that calls for revisions. With respect to (A), 
for instance, we need not say that the very notion of a participant is vague. We 
may hold instead that (A) is perfectly precise and insist that any extant vague-
ness lies in the terms and predicates that serve to pick out the relevant partici-
pants. (We will, in fact, stick to (A) from here on; the improvement represented 
by (A') is, from the perspective of the present proposal, negligible.)  
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To illustrate, consider again a sentence such as (1). Our initial suggestion 
was that the exact location of the event reported by such a sentence (‘Brutus 
stabbed Caesar’) and denoted by the description that comes from it by nominali-
zation (‘Brutus’s stabbing of Caesar’) cannot be identified even if each term and 
predicate occurring in the sentence is assumed to be precise. However, we are 
now in a position to see that this suggestion was conceding too much. A precise 
definition of the extension of the predicate ‘stabbed’ must include the agent and 
the patient of each stabbing, and we could insist that such agents and patients 
should be neither more nor less than the relevant participants of the stabbings. 
Thus, if indeed the predicate ‘stabbed’ fully connotes the relation that is consti-
tutive of the event in question, and if a precisification of this predicate includes 
in its extension the ordered pair 〈Brutus, Caesar〉, then it could be argued that 
such a precisification treats Brutus and Caesar as the relevant participants of the 
event in question.11 In that case, (A) would deliver a precise location for the 
event by identifying it with the mereological sum of the locations of Brutus and 
Caesar. But this is just one possibility. If the extension of the predicate were 
made precise by including, not the ordered pair 〈Brutus, Caesar〉 but, rather, a 
slightly different ordered pair 〈α, β〉 (with α and β properly contained in Brutus 
and Caesar, respectively),12 then (A) would deliver a slightly different location 
for the event reported by (1). Each such precisification would yield a different 
answer to the question, Where did the stabbing take place? And if each precisifi-
cation were equally acceptable, the corresponding multiplicity of answers would 
result in indeterminacy. Yet this indeterminacy would be perfectly standard, in 
that it would be explainable in terms of the indeterminacy of the object-language 
predicate ‘stabbed’. Similarly, in the Titanic case, we could say that a multiplic-
ity of precisifications is available for the predicate ‘hit’, some of which include 
in their extensions the ordered pair 〈Titanic, the iceberg〉 while others include in 
their extensions ordered pairs of the form 〈α, β〉, with α and β properly con-
tained in Titanic and the iceberg, respectively. Because of this multiplicity, the 
location of the event would be indeterminate. But the indeterminacy would be 
purely semantic and would come entirely from the indeterminacy of the object-
language predicate ‘hit’. 
4. Truth and Charity 
This alternative way of cashing out the vague location of an event strikes us 
as both intuitive and theoretically convenient. But there is still a complica-
tion. Suppose we say that Brutus and Caesar were only partly involved in the 
stabbing of the ides of March. (The story is perfectly parallel in the Titanic case, 
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if one likes that example better.) That is, suppose we consider a precise interpre-
tation of our language—i.e., a precisification I of the interpretation I0 fixed by 
our linguistic practices—according to which the extension of the predicate 
‘stabbed’ includes, not the ordered pair 〈Brutus, Caesar〉, but a pair of slightly 
different objects, 〈α, β〉. What are we to say of the sentence in (1)? If I is indeed 
to be compatible with our linguistic practices, then this sentence should count as 
true under I: Brutus did stab Caesar. Yet a direct application of the stan-
dard truth-conditions for atomic sentences would, on the given precisification, 
yield a different answer. By the standard truth-conditions we mean the fol-
lowing: 
(B) A sentence of the form ‘P(a1,..., an)’ is true, according to a (precise) interpre-
tation I, if and only if the ordered n-tuple 〈I(a1),..., I(an)〉 is a member of 
 I(P). 
And if ‘Brutus’ is interpreted as Brutus and ‘Caesar’ as Caesar, then (B) implies 
that (1) is false unless ‘stabbed’ is interpreted in such a way as to include the 
pair 〈Brutus, Caesar〉—which is not the case according to the precisification I 
under consideration. So either we rule out I as inadmissible— along with any 
other precise interpretation of the predicate ‘stabbed’ that fails to include the pair 
〈Brutus, Caesar〉, contrary to the suggestion that this predicate is relevantly 
vague—or something must be done about (B). Of course, we could also bite the 
bullet and concede that, strictly speaking, (1) is false under the given precisifica-
tion I. Since there are also precisifications under which (1) is strictly speaking 
true (namely, those precisifications in which the extension of ‘stabbed’ does in-
clude the pair 〈Brutus, Caesar〉), this means that (1) would eventually be inde-
terminate. The supervaluation would fail to settle on a determinate truth-value. 
This is formally impeccable. But as an account of the matter it is utterly unsatis-
factory. If we are serious about ordinary language—if we want to preserve the 
data insofar as these are fixed by our linguistic practices, at least when these 
practices are not overtly inconsistent—the truth of (1) is non-negotiable. Ditto 
for (2). 
Thus something must be done about (B). This complication is serious be-
cause (B) is a fundamental principle of extensional semantics. However, inde-
pendently of the worry at issue, it should come as no surprise that (B), as any 
principle of formal semantics, involves simplifications that in actual circum-
stances may not be fully fulfilled. Here the underlying presupposition is that an 
atomic sentence of the form ‘P(a1,..., an)’ provides a complete report of a state of 
affairs. Yet in ordinary circumstances this may not be the case, either because 
the predicate ‘P’ gives only an approximate connotation of the relation linking 
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the objects referred to by the singular terms ‘a1’, ... , ‘an’, or because the terms 
themselves pick out the relevant objects with a certain degree of approximation. 
In assessing the truth of a sentence such as  
(4) John’s glass is empty, 
for example, we are supposed to construe the predicate ‘empty’ charitably, al-
lowing for the possibility that there is a straw inside the glass, or that the glass is 
filled with air, or that it still contains a few drops of water. If we just looked at 
the extension of ‘empty’, strictly construed, we might not find John’s glass 
among its members, but this is no reason to regard (4) as false. Similarly, and 
more to the point, in a sentence such as  
(5) John’s bicycle is red, 
the natural thing to do is to construe the referent of ‘John’s bicycle’ charitably. 
Presumably not all of the bicycle is red, but only the frame, possibly only the 
outer surface of the frame. In ordinary circumstances we need not be too specific 
about such matters, so we don’t bother. We often speak synecdochically. But a 
straight application of (B) would deliver the wrong results unless we take such 
matters into account.  
Now, one conservative solution here would be to say that the issue is to be 
dealt with at the level of logical form, without affecting the standard formulation 
of the semantic principle in (B). For instance, we could insist that, once the con-
text is fully clarified, an utterance of (5) should be interpreted as elliptic for 
something like 
(5') The outer surface of the frame of John’s bicycle is red. 
And the truth-conditions for this sentence could be handled directly by (B): (5') 
would be true if the extension of ‘red’ includes the outer surface of the frame of 
John’s bicycle, and false otherwise. If this account is accepted, then we may in-
sist that the case of such sentences as (1) and (2) is no different. We might insist 
that, on closer inspection, an utterance of such sentences should be interpreted as 
elliptic for something else. In these cases the context might not be informative 
enough to tell us exactly what part of Brutus stabbed what part of Caesar or what 
part of Titanic hit the iceberg. But we might still consider reinterpreting our sen-
tences as elliptic existential generalizations: 
(1') A certain part of Brutus stabbed a certain part of Caesar. 
(2') A certain part of Titanic hit a certain part of the iceberg, and down went 
Titanic. 
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This would be enough. For we are thinking of evaluating our sentences with re-
gard to precisifications that interpret ‘stabbed’ and ‘hit’ as relations that hold 
true of certain ordered pairs of objects, α and β, properly included in Brutus and 
Caesar, or in Titanic and the iceberg, respectively. And the semantics for the ex-
istential quantifiers in (1') and (2'), together with (B), would yield the expected 
values.  
If this conservative account of the matter is accepted, then the complication 
dissolves and we are done. The sort of charity required to do justice to our intui-
tive assessment of the truth-values of such sentences as (1) and (2) would be 
taken care of at the level of logical form, prior to the application of our formal 
semantic tools, and this would in no way conflict with the (semantic) account of 
the indeterminacy affecting the location of the events reported by such sen-
tences. The location would be indeterminate precisely because the hidden exis-
tential quantifiers fail to single out the event participants in a determinate way. 
On the other hand, this conservative account faces some problems of its own. 
For one thing, the appeal to logical form may be deemed unattractive on various 
grounds. (Can it be generalized to all cases?) More importantly, its material ade-
quacy is doubtful: whatever parts of Brutus and Caesar qualified as truth-makers 
for (1), interpreted as (1'), would also qualify as truth-makers for a host of other 
sentences, interpreted accordingly. And this would take us back to the general 
problem raised by (A). For example, assuming that Caesar is part of the popu-
lation of Rome, the truth of (1), interpreted as (1'), would imply the truth of  
(6) Brutus stabbed the population of Rome, 
interpreted as  
(6') A certain part of Brutus stabbed a certain part of the population of Rome. 
(The implication would follow from the transitivity of ‘part of’.) But this is idle: 
sentence (6) is plainly false no matter how one understands it.13  
So here is a less conservative option. Let us openly acknowledge the limits 
of (B) and let us account for the charity required by our linguistic practices 
directly at the semantic level. In the terminology used above, this means taking 
seriously the suggestion that in ordinary circumstances we help ourselves with 
singular terms that pick out the referents of our discourse with some degree of 
approximation—not because such terms are vague but because the intended 
referents are vaguely understood. We say ‘John’s bicycle’ meaning some relevant 
part of the bicycle; we say ‘Brutus’ meaning some relevant part of Brutus; we 
say ‘Titanic’ meaning some relevant part of the ship; and so on. The sort of 
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relevance at issue is not specified and in this sense the intended referents are 
only vaguely understood. In ordinary circumstances precision hardly matters, 
hence we generally do not worry about this kind of vagueness. But we do need 
to worry about it when it comes to the task of formally applying a principle such 
as (B).  
To spell out this suggestion more formally, let I be a precise interpretation 
of the language, possibly a precisification of a given vague interpretation. It as-
signs a referent I(a) to every singular term ‘a’ and an extension I(P) to every 
predicate ‘P’. A charitable reading of I may be construed as an interpretation I* 
that yields distinct but suitably related values: each I*(a) may be a slightly dis-
tinct object from I(a) (for instance, a certain proper part of I(a)) and each I*(P) 
might be a set of slightly distinct tuples from those contained in I(P). Then the 
natural thing to do is to revise (B) as follows: 
(B') A sentence of the form ‘P(a1,..., an)’ is true, according to a (precise) interpre-
tation I, if and only if there is a charitable reading I* for I such that the or-
dered n-tuple 〈I*(a1),..., I*(an)〉 is a member of I*(P). 
(The charitable reading of the singular terms is meant to take care of such cases 
as (1), (2), and (5); the charitable reading of the predicates is to take care of 
cases such as (4).)  
Of course, the notion of a charitable reading is heavily context-dependent 
and vague. But this is no big deal. The notion of an admissible precisification 
involved in the basic supervaluational rule, 
(C) A sentence is true, according to an interpretation I0, if and only if it is true 
according to every admissible precisification I of I0, 
is equally vague. This is where the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness kicks 
in. Likewise for (B'). Higher-order semantic indeterminacy is hardly a peculiar-
ity of our event talk, so from the present perspective we should not worry about 
it. (By contrast, the indeterminacy involved in the minimalist criterion (A'), if 
understood as a vague criterion as indicated at the beginning of section 3, would 
be peculiar to our way of understanding event talk and for that reason should be 
avoided.) Note, however, that the notion of a charitable reading is significantly 
different from the notion of a precisification. The latter picks out, compatibly 
with our linguistic practices, a precise referent and a precise extension for each 
vague name and predicate of the language. The former picks out, for each such 
precise interpretation, a contextually plausible variant. Thus, the name ‘Brutus’ 
might be vague in that it may not be clear whether certain bits and pieces are to 
be included in its referent. (Is the cherry that Brutus is presently chewing part of 
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him? Will it be part of Brutus only after he has swallowed it? After he has di-
gested it?) Any admissible way to resolve this vagueness corresponds to a pre-
cisification of ‘Brutus’. And for each such precisification I there may be various 
charitable readings whereby the referent of ‘Brutus’ is interpreted in yet another, 
slightly different way, depending on the context of use of the name.  
So this is how we think the complication can be handled semantically. To 
determine the participants of an event we need consider different ways of pre-
cisifying the predicate connoting the property or relation whose exemplification 
the event is. Each such precisification, in turn, requires that the singular terms 
purporting to denote the participants of the event be understood charitably, and 
(B') provides us with the relevant revision of the standard, uncharitable semantic 
rule (B). How exactly charitable readings should be construed is of course a dif-
ficult question and much work would at this point be required in order to provide 
a thorough account. This may well be a task to be carried out in a case-by-case 
fashion. But we need not spell out the details here. For if the analysis of such 
sentences as (4) and (5) is correct, then some charity appears to be needed across 
the board anyway. It is not just a complication in the semantics of our event talk 
but it affects the semantics of our object talk as well. And that is fair enough: our 
purpose is precisely to show that both sorts of talk are, from a semantic perspec-
tive, on equal footing. 
5. Two Final Worries 
To sum up, then, our proposal involves two main steps. First, we rely on (A) (or 
(A')) to identify the location of an event with the mereological sum of the loca-
tions of its (minimal) participants. Next, we identify the participants of an event 
with the entities that make up the extension of the predicate (e.g., ‘stabbed’) 
used to pick out the event-constitutive property or relation. If this predicate is 
vague, its extension may not be uniquely defined and, consequently, the partici-
pants may not be uniquely identified either, which will induce a corresponding 
indeterminacy in the location of the event. But this indeterminacy is thoroughly 
semantic, precisely insofar as it depends on the semantic indeterminacy of the 
relevant predicate. In addition, we also propose (third) to supplement this ac-
count with a modification of the standard truth conditions for atomic sentences 
of the form ‘P(a1,..., an)’, among which those sentences that report the occur-
rence of an event. Not only should such sentences be evaluated with respect to 
the admissible precisifications of the given interpretation I0 of the language—for 
instance according to the supervaluational rule (C); relative to each precisifica-
tion I of I0, they should be evaluated with respect to a charitable reading I* 
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of I—as per rule (B'). This is not necessary to explain the vagueness associated 
with the location of an event, but it is necessary to ensure that the explanation 
itself does not conflict with the semantic intuitions underlying the corresponding 
event-reporting sentence. 
Is this account general enough? Can every event-referring expression be 
handled along these lines? As we see it, the account works well for those event-
referring expressions that come from nominalization of an event-reporting sen-
tence, as ‘Brutus’s stabbing of Caesar’ comes from nominalization of ‘Brutus 
stabbed Caesar’, on the assumption that the predicate used in the sentence (here: 
‘stabbed’) fully connotes the property or relation that is constitutive of the event 
in question. But there are two residual worries. First, it is a fact that many ordi-
nary event-referring expressions are not of this sort. Consider again ‘the indus-
trial revolution’ or ‘World War II’. What are the object names and predicates 
whose semantics can deliver the (vague) answer to the location question for the 
events picked out by these expressions? Second, even when dealing with event-
referring expressions that do come from nominalization, there is no guarantee 
that the relevant predicate always fully connotes the event-constitutive property 
or relation. In fact we have better not make that assumption. Otherwise one 
might be inclined to conclude that insofar as  
(1) Brutus stabbed Caesar. 
involves a two-place predicate while  
(7) Brutus stabbed Caesar with a knife. 
involves a three-place predicate, the events picked out by the corresponding no-
minalizations would involve a different number of participants and would there-
fore be distinct—contrary to intuition. Likewise, we would have to distinguish 
between such events and the events reported by 
(8) Brutus lowered his right arm. 
(9) Brutus committed homicide. 
(10) Brutus set a bad example for others to follow.  
and so on—again contrary to intuition. At least, this would run against the intui-
tion—which we share—that one and the same event can be re-described in dif-
ferent, non-equivalent ways.14 
So more work is needed. Here we shall confine ourselves to some brief re-
marks, with no pretense of completeness. Concerning the first worry—that not 
every event-referring expression comes from nominalization—it must be ac-
knowledged that our account has no straightforward answer to offer. No object 
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names and predicates are available whose semantics can account for the (vague) 
location of the events picked out by such descriptions as ‘the industrial revolu-
tion’ or ‘World War II’. However, let us point out that such descriptions are 
typically intended to pick out complex events, i.e., events consisting of a multi-
plicity of simpler ones, for which a canonical description by nominalization is in 
principle available. What these simple events are is only vaguely understood, 
and it is in this sense that the descriptions of the relevant complex events are 
vague: there are many collections of little episodes that could legitimately qual-
ify as the constituents of the industrial revolution—many distinct mereological 
aggregates of events that could legitimately qualify as the referent of the term 
‘the industrial revolution’—and when we use this term we are just being vague 
as to which of those collections or aggregates we are referring to. Our linguistic 
practices do not single out a unique referent. But this is no further problem. It is, 
in fact, the exact analogue of the sort of vagueness that we run into when we use 
such vague object designators as ‘Everest’ or ‘Downtown Manhattan’. And for 
such vagueness a straightforward supervaluational account is already available.  
Thus the first worry boils down to this: Are there any event descriptions that 
do not come from nominalization and yet are not meant to pick out com-
plex events? It’s hard to deny this as a matter of principle. The question of 
whether there are any simple, atomic events is by itself a difficult metaphysical 
question and it would be presumptuous to build the answer into a semantic ac-
count of ordinary language. But we conjecture that the simpler an event is—the 
closer it is to being a simple property-exemplification—the more likely it is that 
among our means for referring to it are descriptions that come from nominaliza-
tion. Modulo this conjecture, we are therefore inclined to think that the worry 
can be met. 
One might still object that the conjecture itself, even if accepted, is of dubi-
ous relevance.15 Consider a description that refers to an event indirectly—e.g., 
by temporal relation to another event, as in ‘what Brutus did after Cassius 
handed him the knife’. If such a description is meant to pick out a simple event, 
we are suggesting that an alternative, canonical description of that event can be 
obtained by nominalization (for instance, the description ‘Brutus’s stabbing of 
Caesar’) for which our semantic account is available. Yet it might be observed 
that whether such an alternative description is indeed adequate depends on 
whether it is co-referential with the original, non-canonical description. And 
how can that be established if we are talking about descriptions that are vague? 
More importantly, if the original description is vague, how can we give a seman-
tic account of its vagueness by appeal to the vagueness of terms and/or predi-
cates that do not even appear in that description?  
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Our reply is that nothing peculiar here seems to hinge on the fact that we are 
talking about descriptions of events. We may ask the same questions with re-
spect to object descriptions (or even names), and in such cases the answers seem 
easily available. The terms ‘Mount Everest’ and ‘the tallest mountain’ are both 
vague, yet we are perfectly justified in assuming that they are co-referential. 
More importantly, when it comes to their semantics we are justified in explain-
ing the vagueness of one term directly, and then in relying on that explanation to 
account for the vagueness of the other precisely in virtue of their co-referen-
tiality. If so, then there is in principle nothing illegitimate in supposing that two 
vague event descriptions may be co-referential, or in explaining the vagueness of 
one via the vagueness of the other. It may be hard to find a good canonical de-
scription for an event that is vaguely described in a non-canonical way. But we 
often find it, and when we do we know how to handle the relevant vagueness. 
(“What Brutus did after Cassius handed him the knife was atrocious.” “Why, 
what did he do?” “He stabbed Caesar” “And where did that happen?” Well, it 
depends on how exactly you understand the predicate ‘stabbed’…”) 
Moving now to the second worry—that even a canonical event-referring ex-
pression obtained by nominalization may involve a predicate that fails to fully 
connote the event-constitutive property or relation—several cases may be distin-
guished. Consider first the case illustrated by the opposition between (1) (‘Bru-
tus stabbed Caesar’) and (7) (‘Brutus stabbed Caesar with a knife’). One plausi-
ble view is that only one of these two sentences involves a fully connoting 
predicate. One may take this to be the binary ‘x stabbed y’ (as we have been do-
ing in the foregoing) and construe (7) as a sentence in which the stabbing is said 
to have occurred and to be correlated to the knife by the instrumental tie ex-
pressed by ‘with’. In this case it is certainly possible to understand both sen-
tences as describing one single event with two participants, and the logical nexus 
between (1) and (7) would be one of standard adverbial modification.16 Con-
versely, one may take the fully connoting predicate to be the three-place ‘x 
stabbed y with z’ and construe (1) as elliptic for 
(1" ) Brutus stabbed Caesar with something, 
in which case both (1) and (7) would be about an event with three participants 
and the relevant logical nexus would be one of existential generalization.17 Both 
options are plausible, and both are compatible with the account offered here. 
Now consider the opposition between (1) and, say, (8) (‘Brutus lowered his 
right arm’). If we think these sentences report different events, then fine. But if 
we want to regard both sentences as reporting the same event, then we face a 
greater difficulty because the predicates they involve are logically independent 
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of each other. We may still insist that one of these sentences tells the whole truth 
about what happened (albeit vaguely) and provide a suitable paraphrase of the 
other. (For instance, if we think that ‘stabbed’ fully connotes the relevant event-
constitutive relation, we may say that (8) is elliptical for something like 
(8' ) Brutus lowered his right arm upon Caesar, 
where ‘lowered his arm upon’ is a predicate that only partially connotes the rela-
tion connoted by ‘stabbed’.) But in general there is no reason to think that such a 
paraphrase is always available, let alone plausible. Rather, it seems to us that 
such cases suggest a different diagnosis. We just have to acknowledge that when 
a predicate does not fully connote, or does not connote at all, the relevant event-
constitutive property or relation, its semantics may not be informative about the 
identity (and location) of the reported event. We can still form a description of 
the event by ordinary nominalization. But this description may be as mislead-
ing—semantically—as any description that refers to the event indirectly, as with 
‘the industrial revolution’ or ‘what Brutus did after Cassius handed him the 
knife’. To put it differently, our account has been developed with respect to ca-
nonical event-descriptions obtained by nominalization of atomic sentences in 
which the predicate is assumed to fully connote the property or relation that is 
constitutive of the reported event. When this assumption is not met, the nominal-
ization is semantically uninformative. It may be that in spite of the appearances 
we are dealing with a complex event, in which case we have already seen how to 
proceed. (Consider ‘the discovery of penicillin’; although grammatically this de-
scription comes from nominalization of ‘Penicillin was discovered’, it can hardly 
be regarded as referring to a simple event and its semantics is best treated in 
analogy to ‘the industrial revolution’.) Or perhaps we are dealing with a simple 
event, but an event whose canonical description is quite different, in which case 
we have to come up with that description before providing a detailed semantic 
account along the lines suggested here. Indeed, we are inclined to think that we 
often find ourselves in this situation. The metaphysical thesis that an event is the 
exemplification of a certain property by certain objects at a certain time does not 
imply that every expression referring to that event involves names and predicates 
that aim to pick out the relevant property and objects, even when the expression 
is—grammatically—the result of a nominalization. When it does not involve 
such names and predicates, our semantic account can only be applied indirectly.  
These limitations are not to be underestimated. They show that the seman-
tics of our event talk is indeed quite a complex matter. Nonetheless we conclude 
that in view of the account offered above the asymmetry between objects and
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events vis-à-vis the phenomenon of vagueness loses its force. There certainly is 
a greater difficulty in determining the reference of our event talk. But the differ-
ence is one of degree and should not be given theoretical weight. What event an 
expression is about is not something that can be accurately inferred from the 
words we use; it depends heavily on context and unprincipled intuitions—much 
more heavily than with ordinary object talk. This results in massive semantic 
vagueness. But this is no reason to do away with events altogether, just as the 
vagueness of our object talk is no good reason to do away with the ontological 
category of objects.18 
Notes 
 
1 The epistemic account of vagueness, in general and presumably also in cases such 
as these, is defended e.g. by Sorensen (1988) and Williamson (1994). 
2 Here and below we speak of ‘event designators’ in the broadest sense, to include 
any expressions that can be used to refer to individual events. We doubt there are any 
logically proper names of events, though. In those few cases where grammatical proper 
names are used—e.g., to refer to hurricanes—they arguably function as disguised defi-
nite descriptions. (See Bennett 1988: Ch.1).  
3 With some exceptions—e.g., Unger (1979). Indeed, Unger’s view is not as idio-
syncratic as it might sound. Several defenses of the four-dimensionalist conception of 
objects (e.g., Heller 1990 and Sider 2001) arise from similar concerns.  
4 On this we refer to Varzi (2001, 2002), respectively. The supervaluational ac-
count of vagueness goes back to Fine (1975); its application to singular terms stems 
from Lewis (1988).  
5 Some philosophers have questioned the assumption, citing as counterexamples 
changes in light or weather conditions (Brand 1977: 335) or, perhaps more plausibly, 
flashes and bangs (Strawson 1959: 46). We do not see the force of such counterexam-
ples and we align ourselves with Bennett (1988: §5): a flash occurred because of how 
certain photons moved; a bang occurred because of how air ondulated; and so on.  
6 This is the view originated with Kim (1966) and Goldman (1970). Some authors 
might want to resist the identification and speak of supervenience instead: an event su-
pervenes on the relevant property exemplification. We go along with the standard view, 
but what follows does not depend significantly on this decision.   
7 Ter Meulen (1987) objects to this suggestion on the following grounds. If we 
suppose, contrary to facts, that Brutus and Ceasar killed each other (simultaneously), 
then (A) would offer no explanation of the difference between the events described by 
‘Brutus killed Caesar’ and ‘Caesar killed Brutus’. We reply that if Brutus and Caesar 
are indeed the participants of these events, then (A) would imply their co-location while 
staying neutral (and correctly so) with respect to the issue of their distinctness. By con-
trast, if only part of Brutus was involved in the killing of Caesar or only part of Caesar 
involved in the killing of Brutus, then (A) (or rather (A') below) would correctly imply 
that the two events have distinct locations.  
18 
 
8 See e.g. Lombard (1986: 120f) (and the anticipation in Davidson 1967b: 124). 
9 This is the solution proposed by Lombard as well as others—e.g., Dretske (1967: 
488) and Davidson (1969: 228).  
10 Philosophers who deny mereological extensionality (or the constitution-as-
identity thesis) might want to say that the sinking had more than one participant, e.g., 
Titanic and the mereological sum of its parts. (See e.g. Carter 1989: 222f). But that 
would not have any bearing on the present issue, as the two (or more) entities in ques-
tion would be perfectly co-located. 
11 Should the knife (say) be counted as a participant, too? We shall come back to 
this question in the final section. For the moment we assume that ‘stabbed’ is a binary 
predicate that fully connotes the relevant event-constitutive relation, hence that the 
event in question only involves two participants.  
12 For the sake of the example we shall suppose this to be a genuine possibility. As 
we mentioned, one could argue that a stabbing must be performed by a whole person, 
but this sort of suggestion can hardly be generalized to all cases (as illustrated by the 
Titanic example). 
13 Again, one could insist that (6') should be ruled out as inacceptable on the 
grounds that ‘stabbed’ imposes certain restrictions on the entities that can fill its argu-
ment places. (See previous note.) But then the solution would not be based exclusively 
on considerations of logical form but, rather, on a complicated interplay between logical 
form and lexical semantics. 
14 We have assumed that events are property exemplifications, following Kim 
(1966) and Goldman (1970). But we have not assumed the semantics that is usually as-
sociated with such metaphysics: the thesis that an event is an exemplification of a cer-
tain property, P, does not imply that any description of that event contains a predicate 
that fully connotes P. (So, again, we agree with Bennett 1988: Ch. 5).   
15 We are thankful to a referee for pointing this out. 
16 This would be in the spirit of Davidson’s (1967a) treatment of adverbs. 
17 In the spirit of Rescher (1967). 
18 This paper grew out of portions of a paper presented by AV at the Conference on 
The Nature and Structure of States and Events (University of Southern California, Los 
Angeles, February 16, 2003). We are thankful to the discussants, Michael Glanzberg 
and Delia Graff, and to Jim Higgimbotham for their helpful comments on the confer-
ence paper, and to the referees of Philosophical Studies for their detailed remarks on the 
revised version. 
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